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exports in favor of new duties to be applied to the facilitation of shipping; and the contracting powers may maintain warships on the Danube. A death blow is thus dealt to one of the most progressive international institutions; for the Danube Commission, created by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, was independent of the territorial governments, and its members with their privilege of territorial inviolability superintended the free navigation of the Danube for the merchant ships of all nations alike. The discrimination introduced by the Central Powers forecasts a repudiation of the international character of the great highways of commerce and a return to the exclusive policies of the 18th century.

**Recognition of the Czechoslovak Nation.** The official recognition accorded to the Czechoslovak nation by the United States government in September was of a unique character in the history of international relations. The traditional rule of international law has been that a new nation will be recognized by the existing members of the family of nations only when, after successful revolution against the state of which it was formerly a part, it has given evidence of its ability to maintain itself. In most cases the new community is recognized as a *de facto* belligerent before its final recognition as a *de jure* state is accorded. In every instance the claimant for international recognition must have obtained possession of definite territory and must have organized a government capable of giving expression to the will of its people. But in the case of the recognition of the Czechoslovak nation these conditions have not been fulfilled. In the first place recognition has been accorded, not to a government established in the territory inhabited by the Czechoslovak people, but to a National Council with headquarters in Washington. Moreover, the new state can hardly be said to have at present a *de facto* existence. Its active supporters are to be found among the groups of Czechoslovaks in Siberia and in the states of the Entente Allies. Technically these groups are alien enemies, but because of their known hostility to Austria-Hungary they have been shown from the beginning of the war exceptional treatment, and in France they have been organized into distinct military units with a national flag. The National Council is therefore an absentee government in command of a number of distinct armies fighting against the nation of which their territory is still a *de facto* part and to which their brethren in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia are still rendering a formal allegiance.

How far can it be said that this National Council represents the people of the territories which are to be included in the new nation? As a point of fact there is but little doubt but that the National Council would have the support of a large majority of the people it assumes to represent if they were in a position to endow it with authority by a formal referendum. Moreover the people of those territories have on various occasions expressed, through their delegates to the Austrian Reichsrat, notably in a declaration drawn up at Prague on January 6, 1918, their desire to form a national state, and they have failed to establish a legal government only because of the difficulty of organizing a revolution when the fighting forces of their country were scattered throughout the divisions of the Austro-Hungarian army. Further, it is to be noted that the National Council has only been given provisional recognition, that is, to use the language of the British government on August 13, it was recognized "as the supreme organ of the Czechoslovak national interests and as the present trustee of the future Czechoslovak Government to exercise supreme authority over this allied and belligerent army."

The territory of the new state is, on the authority of Dr. Masaryk, president of the National Council, to embrace Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia within their historical boundaries, together with Slovakia as far south as Presburg and as far east as Ungvar, comprising in all about 12,000,000 people. Within these boundaries Bohemia and Moravia will embrace a large minority of Germans, estimated as high as thirty-five per cent in Bohemia and thirty per cent in Moravia, while Silesia will embrace not only a German minority of nearly fifty per cent but a Polish minority as well. Dr. Masaryk rejects the idea of a rectification of the historical boundaries, but promises to confer upon the German minority "the same local self-government which obtains in other parts of the country." This, however, would not exempt the German minority from being conscripted into a future Czechoslovak army to fight, it might be, against their racial brethren in Germany or Austria. As the German elements are mostly to be found in an outer circle around Bohemia and in the northwestern part of Silesia, it has been regarded by many publicists as more consistent with the principle of self-determination that the boundaries should be drawn to exclude that portion of the German population rather than to attempt to reproduce the present situation in Austria and Hungary on a smaller and reversed scale.

The conflict between historical boundaries and the principle of self-determination is due both to the fact that national boundaries have been drawn not according to logical principles but according to the dictation of conquering armies, thus including large alien populations, and also to the fact that where originally embracing a homogeneous people the ancient boundaries have been so encroached upon by immigration that they have ceased to be logical any longer. Historical Poland held within its boundaries many subject nationalities, its dominion extending at one time from the Baltic to the Black Sea, so that the very claim of Poland to the right of self-determination involves a repudiation of the Polish boundaries of the 17th and 18th centuries.

Many students of the Austro-Hungarian problem claim that the autonomy of the several nationalities as members of a federal empire would be a better solution than the creation of new independent states. The earlier attitude of the United States government, expressed in the address of the President to Congress on December 4, 1917, was one of noninterference in what were regarded as the domestic affairs of another state. "We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically." Scarcely a month later, in an address before Congress on January 8, 1918, President Wilson made a new statement of the war aims of the United States under fourteen headings, the tenth of which called for the "freest opportunity of autonomous development" for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. Three days earlier the British Prime Minister made a similar statement of terms in which he asserted that unless self-government were granted to the Austro-Hungarian nationalities which desired it, it would be impossible to hope for "a removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened the general peace."

The advantages claimed for the federal solution, which would create a series of autonomous states united under a constitution defining their rights and the relations between them and the central government, bear chiefly upon the better protection thus afforded to the hostile minorities which will necessarily be included in the new states, and upon the superior economic advantages enjoyed by the states as members of a federation having no tariff boundaries between its members and offering unimpeded transportation over the rivers and waterways of the federated territory. The Czechoslovaks are, indeed, in a peculiarly difficult situation in that they form an inland state with no

outlet to the sea except through German, Austrian, or, it may be, Jugoslav territory. On the other hand it is strenuously urged that a solution which might have been possible before 1914 has now become impossible in consequence of the hatreds engendered by the administrative policies pursued by Austria-Hungary during the war and by the conscription of the Czechoslovaks into the imperial army against their will. Moreover, it is felt that under the scheme of a federation the foreign policy of the federal empire would be controlled by the predominant Austro-German-Magyar group, acting in close harmony with Berlin, whereas an independent Czechoslovak state, especially if supported by an independent Yugoslav state, would be a permanent barrier to the plan of a Pan-German *Mittel-Europa*. The problem of the Czechoslovak nation cannot, it is clear, be considered in isolation; and the justice which the Allied powers wish to see done to the claims of a long-suffering people will doubtless be attainable only within the structure of a larger League of Nations.

**Jugoslavic National Unity.** While Great Britain, France, and the United States have officially recognized the new Czechoslovak nation, another group of Slavs is pressing for similar recognition as an independent international person. On July 4 the Yugoslav flag marking the unity and independence of the nation was formally raised on the grounds of the agricultural building in Washington before a large gathering of native citizens both of the independent southern Slav states and of the subject nationalities of Austria and Hungary allied to them in race and language. Semi-official recognition had already been given by the United States government in the form of a declaration from the department of state on May 29 announcing that "the proceedings of the Congress of Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary, which was held in Rome in April, have been followed with great interest by the Government of the United States, and that the nationalistic aspirations of the Czeco-Slovaks and the Yugoslavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy of this Government." Following this statement from the American government the Supreme War Council of the allied governments expressed on June 4 "the greatest sympathy with the national aspirations of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs for freedom."

The chief stumbling block in the path of the movement for Jugoslav unity was removed at the above-mentioned congress. Until the meeting of this congress the claims of Italy to Dalmatia, sanctioned by the treaty between Italy and the Entente Allies which brought